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ABSTRACT: Professor Schmidt-Leukel has claimed that there are only 
four possible views about truth in religion. Either no religions are 
true, or only one religion is true (exclusivism), or many are true, and 
either one is superior (inclusivism) or all are about equally true 
(pluralism). I argue that the ideas of equal or superior truth are 
unclear, and that there are many other possible views. I propose a 
twofold contrast – between closed (rigid, crucially important, and 
totally authoritative) and open (flexible, varying in importance, and 
restrictedly authoritative); and between exclusive (only one path 
leads to salvation) and inclusive (many paths lead towards salvation).  
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Religion as propositional 
The classification of religious attitudes to other religions than one’s 
own into exclusive, inclusive, and pluralist has been very useful. But 
it is in danger of becoming a Procrustean bed into which all inter-
faith attitudes can be fitted, and that is not so useful.  
Professor Schmidt-Leukel, in  his paper, ‘Religious Pluralism in 
Thirteen Theses’ in ‘Modern Believing’ 57.1, designs an especially 
Procrustean bed, and claims that there are only four possible options 
on how to interpret religious truth claims. The hackles of any logician 
will rise at being told that there is only a definite number of logical 
options when dealing with something so fuzzy as ordinary language. 
It can easily be shown that there are more than the four options 
Professor Schmidt-Leukel mentions. It can also quickly be made 
apparent that the attempt to impose this sort of logical rigour onto 
ordinary language talk about something so fuzzy as ‘religion’ can be 
rather misleading. 
It is notoriously difficult to define what ‘religion’ is, but I think one 
thing it is not is a closed set of truth-claiming propositions. To say 
that a religion is true seems to be a category mistake, since truth is a 
property of propositions. Religions do typically contain such 
propositions, and what one has to ask is whether these propositions, 
taken individually, are true or false. This is so in regard to 
propositions which claim to show a path to salvation, with which 
Professor Schmidt-Leukel  is concerned.  
The ascription of ‘true’ to a proposition necessarily entails that some 
other proposition (its contradictory) is ‘false’. It immediately follows 
that not all propositions can be true, and that true propositions 
necessarily have possible contradictories. It is therefore a logical 
necessity that any proposition in religion can be contradicted.  And 
two contradictory statements cannot both be true. 
Some religions lay out a set of propositions which show a specific 
path to salvation. This gives a first set of three logical possibilities: all 
religions specify a path to salvation; or only some religions do; or no 
religions do. It is fairly obvious that only some do – Shinto, to take 
one of hundreds of examples, is not concerned with salvation in any 
sense remotely similar to the Christian idea of everlasting life with 
God. So we are left with a sub-class of religions that specify a 
definition of salvation and a path to salvation. Whatever we say 
about this sub-class may not apply to religions as such. 
Religion as a way of life 
I would not attempt to define ‘religion’, but it is characteristic of a 
religion that it specifies a rule of life. A ‘religious’ person is one who 
follows such a rule as of primary importance in their lives. This rule 
usually specifies appropriate attitudes to a non-material reality of 
objective and normative value – prayer to a god who makes moral 
demands, or meditation leading to the realisation of valued mental 
states, or rituals aligning individuals with some objectively true way 
of being. Also, religious rules are usually related to membership of a 
religious community or group, though such membership may be very 
loose.  
The acceptance of some propositions as true is entailed by the 
adoption of a rule of life. But exactly what these propositions are is 
open to many interpretations. They can be very flexibly and vaguely 
defined –as reverence for the life-forces of the natural world, for 
instance (like kami, in Japanese rituals). What a ‘life-force’ is may 
remain unconceptualised, though it is not ordinarily physical and it is 
in some undefined way mind-like (responsive to prayers and 
offerings). There is often resistance to attempting closer definitions, 
and emphasis on the cultivation of a non-conceptualised sense of 
reverence or dependence.  
Where the conceptual content of a religious rule of life is flexibly 
defined, it is hard to say exactly what an ascription of truth excludes 
– except perhaps that it excludes reductive materialism and the 
reduction of values to purely subjective preferences, though even 
that may be contested.  
It is not surprising that different tribal ways of life are often not felt 
to exclude one another, in a conceptual sense. A sense of 
dependence and harmony with nature can be expressed in many 
different ways. Of course, life-ways can be exclusive in another 
sense, that they define a culture, which may seek to impose itself on 
other cultures. Thus the saying of Hindutva, ‘To be Indian is to be 
Hindu’ is not an assertion that you must assent to a particular set of 
propositions, but an assertion that one must accept the spiritual 
practices of a specific culture. An individual may select from among 
these practices, or even adopt no spiritual rule of life, but is expected 
to support the exclusive propriety of such rules of life as are licensed 
by the culture.  
Religious exclusivism is not usually the assertion that only the set of 
propositions licensed by my religion is true. Hindus would be hard 
put to it to specify just what that set was. It is more often the 
assertion that only the spiritual rules of life licensed by my culture 
(which may be very broad and diverse, but still exclude some 
practices, like Christianity and Islam in the Hindu case) are socially 
acceptable.  
Christianity is, to an unusual degree, a very propositional form of 
religion, where assent to detailed creeds is often required. Even 
then, many interpretations of the creeds may be acceptable. The 
ascension of Jesus into heaven may be given a metaphorical 
interpretation, for instance. So might the Genesis creation account 
or the Book of Revelation talk of eschatology.  
In this situation it is not, I think, very helpful to say that different 
messages of salvation – definitions of what salvation is, and how to 
attain it – can all be true. What matters is how rigid such beliefs are, 
how important they are felt to be, how many different detailed 
analyses of beliefs there may be, and how many beliefs prevalent in 
a given religious society can safely be rejected or ignored.  
Some Christians may give a very precise, rigidly defined, and detailed 
account of salvation and a precise account of how to be saved. They 
may think it is crucially important to have those beliefs, deny that 
different interpretations are acceptable, and say that no beliefs in 
their authoritative account can be ignored.  
But others may give a much less rigid account – perhaps, that 
salvation is human fulfilment in relation to a supreme source of 
value, and that trying to follow Jesus in a life of self-giving love is a 
good way to achieve salvation. They may say that there are many 
diverse detailed ways of filling out these flexible notions, that some 
of these more detailed ways can be ignored or rejected, and that it is 
usually not of great importance, though it may be of great interest, 
to have such detailed accounts. And between these two extremes is 
a whole spectrum of other possibilities. 
Religious truth claims 
Now consider Professor Schmidt-Leukel’s allegedly ‘exhaustive’ list of 
possible answers to the question of the truth of religious claims 
about paths to salvation. First, we could say that all such claims are 
false – there is no salvation. Second, we could say that only one set 
of claims is true. This must be the case, if diverse sets of claims 
contradict each other. It might be that there is one rigid definition of 
salvation and its path, given on unquestionable authority (that is the 
‘exclusivist’ view). He then lists just two further views – that many 
sets of claims in a religion are true, but one is superior; and that 
many sets of claims are true, but equal in truth. I doubt whether 
these are most helpfully construed as different views of truth, since 
they both in fact (I shall argue) hold that only one set of claims is 
true, but they spread those claims over a number of ‘religions’. I also 
doubt whether there are only these two further possibilities. 
The most obvious possibility he does not mention is that many 
religions are true, but some of them (not just one) are true in a 
superior  way, perhaps with varying degrees of superiority (probably 
construed in terms of the rigidity or perceived importance or 
authoritativeness of defined propositions). If the idea of ‘superior 
truth’ makes sense, this is an obvious possibility in addition to there 
being just one superior truth, or to many religions being equally true. 
 There are other possibilities also. There could be a true set of claims 
about salvation, though it is not held by any one religion (every 
actual religion might make mistakes in defining salvation and its 
path). We could dissociate truth-claims from a particular community 
or authority. We could practice ‘multiple belonging’, or better, ‘non-
belonging’, constructing a rule of life of our own, and selecting what 
we think to be important or capable of detailed definition. We are 
not then saying that ‘many actual religions are true’. We are saying 
that many of them contain some true (but also some false) salvific 
claims, and that it is better not to belong strictly to any of them. 
Another possibility is that the definition of salvation in some religion 
might be so flexible that it is unclear what would contradict it (If God 
is Being-itself, another religion that stressed union with Being but did 
not speak of God could be complementary, not contradictory. Both 
could be called ‘true’, but to say that would obscure the main point, 
which is that flexible truth-claims can be stated so as not to 
contradict each other). Obviously any statement that such definitions 
must be rigid would raise a contradiction (that contradiction would 
be internal to that religion). This is not really saying that many 
religions are more or less ‘equally true’. It is saying that very flexibly 
phrased truths allow acceptance of complementary (but not 
contradictory) truths. This is like the view Elizabeth Harris takes in 
her paper, ’How Buddhism has affected my Faith’, in the same issue 
of the journal, where she says that for her belief in God is primary, 
but Buddhist practices valuably complement Christian ones, and 
even help to correct some limitations present in traditional 
Christianity (on the treatment of animals, for example). On such a 
view, one can belong to one tradition, and use complementary 
practices and concepts from others, or one can belong to two or 
more traditions, while rejecting some of the truth-claims of each, 
perhaps. 
 A different view is that you might have a rigid definition of salvation 
(for instance, that salvation is union with a Trinitarian God) with a 
flexible definition of the path to it (there may be many 
complementary paths that lead, however deviously, towards the one 
goal). This is close to the so-called ‘inclusivist’ view. But the salvific 
definition does not ‘include’ all truth statements in other religions, 
and its truth is not ‘superior’. Its definition of salvation is just 
straightforwardly true, and it might be better to say that the 
attainment of salvation is compatible with believing many false 
propositions. 
 A more radical view is that there might be different goals 
(definitions of salvation), which could all be attained by their own 
paths (in a sense, all religions might be ‘true’). Christians go to 
heaven, Buddhists enter Nirvana; Christians get resurrected, and 
Hindus get re-incarnated. It is hard to take this seriously, but some 
do, and it is possibly true, even if unlikely. Of course, if you say that 
heaven is more like Nirvana than has often been thought, and vice 
versa; and that resurrection in a succession of bodies is more like re-
incarnation than is commonly thought, and vice versa; then that is 
back to the position that if truths are understood flexibly enough, 
they can be complementary. 
 Alternatively, there might be quite rigid definitions of goal and path 
given by some authority, but great flexibility in how far one had to 
conform to that authority. This would not be saying that many views 
are true, or that one is superior to others. It is saying that there is an 
official view, but one is free to reject or loosen parts of it if that 
seems appropriate. I suspect this is the actual position of many 
Christian believers.  
Finally, there might be moral, intellectual, and psychological criteria 
which religions have to meet to be acceptable (perhaps they must be 
good, rational, and personally fulfilling), but all religions that met 
them could be called ‘true’, since they are all mythical frameworks 
for supporting ways of life that turn people from self-centredness to 
Reality-centredness. This seems to be John Hick’s view, and it is a 
viable possibility. But of course it will be opposed by anyone who 
thinks that there really is, or that there really is not, a personal God.  
In conclusion 
I doubt if I have covered all possibilities, since the concept of religion 
is a very flexible concept, and ‘truth’ is only one component that 
exists within a complex context of practice and community. Truth 
itself is a highly contested concept among philosophers. It is 
important in religion, but it is unlikely that it can be neatly aligned 
with an allegedly exhaustive list of alternatives in the messy and not 
logically neat world in which we live.  
So I think the ‘exclusive/inclusive/pluralist’ distinction has been very 
helpful. But it has sometimes led to unclear assertions about 
different religions being superior or equal to each other. So it might 
be helpful to distinguish clearly between believing true propositions 
and being saved, enlightened, or liberated. Then one can have the 
following fourfold division with regard to questions about the true 
way to salvation. 
There is first a division between ‘closed’ and ‘open’ ways of affirming 
truths. The closed way is to insist on one rigid and unchangeable 
definition of the goal of salvation, and to hold that accepting this 
definition is crucially important to salvation. A closed way will usually 
also hold that some authority gives the definitions, and is to be 
accepted unquestioningly. The open way is to adopt a more flexible 
view, and be prepared to accept new insights from developments in 
knowledge and from other religious traditions. It will usually hold 
that not all truths widely propounded in a religion are equally 
important, and that any religious authority that exists should allow 
disagreement on less important issues. 
Second, there is a division between ‘inclusive’ and ‘exclusive’ 
attitudes to salvation. The exclusive way is to insist that there is only 
one rigidly defined way to salvation. The inclusive way is to say that 
all people are included in the possibility of salvation, if they follow 
their own paths justly and sincerely. Then one might recommend an 
open and inclusive attitude to many religions, while avoiding 
questions about whether one is ‘more true’ than another, or 
whether some of them are ‘equally true’. 
Above all, one can stop saying that religions are true or false, as 
though a religion consisted just of a set of truth-valued propositions 
that could be neutrally assessed. There are sets of truths in religion, 
and one should be concerned to believe only true propositions. But 
one should also be hesitant about claiming to know all these true 
propositions, and be aware of the ethical, ritual, and social 
dimensions which are so important to becoming a member of a 
religion. In this respect, of course, most of what Professor Schmidt-
Leukel says is true and important. But it does not really entail that 
there are only four possible attitudes to take to inter-religious truth, 
or that becoming a pluralist and saying that many religions are more 
or less equally true is the most reasonable position to choose. Since 
few religious believers are likely to think that lots of other religious 
beliefs are just as true as the ones they hold dear, this will be no 
great loss to the cause of inter-religious dialogue. 
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